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I g perspectives 
What happens when a company that has been named "the most
innovatiive company in the ll11ite<l States" every year between
1996 and 2001 by Fortune magazine has trouble generating Lhti 
earningsi 11 11ti 11etli11g t }le [)rofits t}1dt \,Vc1}l St reel ,111Li its dC]t)ri11g 
st1arr• 1 >l1ler:-; t1ad <~<)111f! lo eXJ)ec:t? \Vhat l1a1111e11s \\'l1e11 exPt:t1Li,,,,s 
realizo tl1at ,vl1at l1a ... l18f.!11 rJeggP-rl 1y 111an, 1 as t}1e ··l)t1si11ess 111cJC1("1 
oi tl1P f ti tltf•· tt1r11s out 11ot lo l1c tl1f~ revf;IlLIP. gc11crati11g juggc111at1t 
it \,vas t t1lecl to 11<'? \Vl1at hal>µo11c: \·vl1P11 ~'Oll arl1 operati11g i11 a11 
e11vi1c111 11e11l c.lS 111tlorgi\ri11g us \.Vall Street where tl1e slig11t<_!St l1i11t 
of \\ ed~ 1t•.s::; co11ll1 catLse ,·c>Llr stuck t<.1 lt1111l;le to L111recovt:.1r1:1lJle 
1<J\\ s'? \,\ l1dl l1a1)!)fJt1s \·\ l1en verv IJrigl1l. sttC(.essfLtl JJe<J{Jle \\'110 
arP 11 f cl l<l sL1t-:l~ess a11cl ar:l1ievi11g tl1eir gt,als 111L1st clP-al "vitl1 a 
r;rilo1-; ill·r·" rf l 11r>r0,,Prlf{ 1jerl ~ag11itt1rl---.' 
Nol unlike l11e famous magician 
and escaJJe artist Tlarry Houdini, who 
used illusions lo fuse an audience's 
perceptions with their realities. U1ose 
tasked to steer the ship that some 
refer to as the "Evil E" sel oul to do 
the very same thing, only ,vilh sn1oke 
scrocns and rrwTors of a different sorl. 
Tl's hard to say where the sno,vbal I got 
so big that il spiraled oul of control. It 
probably started s1nal.l. Out accounting 
fraud is a lot like lying. You have lo tell 
addilioual lies lo cover for the previous 
ones, and then 1nore lies still to cover 
U1os1:>, anti so on aud so om uolil tH1tlcr 
the pres~nre and the scrutiny, your 
house of cards evcnttLally co.mes 
tun1bling down. 
VVhat happened with Enron was 
no exception. Broken down lo its 
lo,11est cmnmon rlenon1inator, Enron's 
problems stemmed from the fact that 
the financial position that it reported 
to the investing public was a n1aterial 
departure fron1 its lrue financial 
position: Enron reported misstatements 
over a period of years. 
The thing to appreciate here, however, 
is U1al financial fraud is nothing new. 
Unfortunately, companies have been 
perpetrating such frauds for years. But 
what n1akes Enron unique, qualifying ii 
for case studies and discussious in law 
schools and business schools for years 
to co,ne, are l11e mea.ns and 1netbods 
by which Enron created its illusions 
of prosperity and profitability. This 
article alle1npts to unravel that tangled 
web. at least a portion of ii, and gives 
LLS a bird's eye view so that, al the very 
least, we can have a belier appreciation 
of what Enron did and how. 
The Pressure is On - Enron's 
Dilen1n1a 
How do you record earnings on 
your financial stalen1onls in excess of 
what you are actually earning? How 
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do you prevent from disclosing debt 
obligations ou your balance sheet that 
you actually oive'! How do you report 
that your operations are generating 
a healthy flow of cash when in fact 
they are not'! At lhe intersection of 
expectations and a reality that falls far 
short lies a r,ressure point that pushed 
Enron over tl1e edge and into a pattern 
of fraud and 1nanipulation that affected 
the lives and livelihoods of millions. 
Enron's ans\ver lo this dilemma ·was 
something called the Special Purpose 
Entity (SPE). 
Whal Are SPEs'! 
Tliougb SPEs are considered lo be 
complex a1J1d complicated entities, 
the general premise of a Special 
Purpose Entity is simple. An SPE is 
an entity formed for a discreet and 
isolated purpose, designed to adhere 
to a specific business or economic 
objective. 
perspectives 
The idea behind Lho Special Purpose 
Enlily is lo narrow the scope o[ risk 
to Lhc assets ru1d liabilities placed 
w'ithin the SPE, such Ll1al potential 
i1,vestors or equity holders' forltu1es 
or misfortones will be based entirely 
and exclusively on what happens to 
the assets and liabilities placed within 
the SPE. 
Ho\V Enron Abused the SPE 
Slruclure 
II is i1nportant to understand 
that there are legit i1nate uses for 
the SPE. which have comn1on and 
noncontroversial uses in our economy; 
with the securilizalion of accounl 
receivables being the 1nost conunon. 
Bul it is also iinporlanl to tmderstand 
and appreciate thal the SPE structure. 
because of its nature and form, can 
lend itself Lo being abused by those 
intent on achieving accountrng results 
that have no real underlying econornic 
substance. 
The Dark Comes to Light 
To those of you outside the accotmting 
world looking in, your impression of 
accounting (and perhaps accountants 
for that matter) may be one of strict 
adherence to structure and rigidity, 
where, m the end, everything n1us1 
balance. But those Uta! a.re closer to 
the ntunbers know that accounting is 
just as much art as it is science, where 
numbers cau be n1aniptdated and 
;'massaged" to paiut a picture just like 
a brush ou canvas. 
Enron filed for bankruptcy in 
2001. Once tl1e investigations into 
ils financial situation began, the ft1ll 
breadth and depth of its fraudulent 
finru1ciaJ misdeeds canto to light. 
Enron used several different types of 
"accounting techniques" to manipulate 
its 6nru1cial statements, all of which 
involved the use of the SPE structure. 
For illt1stration purposes, l \vill 
exa1nine only one of these techniques: 
Ll1e 'Y.AS 140 transact.ion." Tbe FAS 
140 transaction is so named because it 
is designed to comply ,vith Financial 
Accounting Standard 140, which sets 
forth the accounting guidelines related 






Enron used this rJ\S 140 transaction 
effectively Lo boost ils financial 
portrait. l'or example. in the year 
2000, Enron increased its reported net 
incon1e by $351.6 million. ,vhich was 
;{6 percent of its reported net income. 
That is, 36 percent of Enron's reported 
earni11gs in the year 2000 weren't 
actually money generated through its 
22l'i't' 
operations. but was money that ,vas 
"engineered'' through the use of these 
FAS l 40 transactions. 
Generating Fictitious Revenue 
- Ho"' Enron Did It 
Enron, i11 addition Lo its core 
operations, had a n11mber of 
investments and bolrUngs in other 
companies and operations. One of 
the ways in which Enron created the 
illusion of ea.ni.i.o.gs was through its 
use of1hese investments and holdit1gs. 
An in1portant point to note, however, 
is that due to the speculative nature 
of these holdings. realizing actual 
cash inllow from these holdings was 
doubtful at ·best. Bui Lbat didn't stop 
Enron from being creative wilh these 
assets. To create a situation where it 
could report a transaction as earnings, 
Enron took these invesllnenls and 
11·ansferred then1 into an Enron-formed 
subsidiary. \l\le'll call thP. subsidiary an 
''.l\sset LLC." The Asset LLC in turn 
issued two classes of stock. Class 
J\ ru1d Class B. The Class A stock 
represented the Asset IJ.,C's voling 
interests, whereas I he Class B shares 
representecll the economic interest in 
Llie LLC. The Class J\ jnteresls were 
issued to Enron, and Lhe Class B 
economic interests were issued to an 
SPE, generally a "Share Trust." The 
Class B interests sold lo the 11·ust wore 
not entitled to voting rights, but they 
\Vere entitled lo substantially all of the 
eco1101nic interests i.11 the Asset LLC. 
Al this point, when Enron made the 
transfers, il recorded Lhe transfer price 
as revenue in its financial statements. 
Jn lheory, Enron was selling 
these assets to these Enron-forn1ed 
subsidiaries and thereby justified 
recording Ute b'ansfers as sales. 
However, recording Ll1u lransfers as 
perspectives 
sales was not proper under GeneralJ y 
Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) because Enron still n1aintained 
control of the lransferred assets 
through its o,vnership of the Class A 
voting interests. Enron ignored this 
;;technicality.'' however. and chose to 
record the transfers as sales any,vay. 
Again, when broken down lo the 
lo\vest common denominator, sin1ple 
fraud is what is left. 
Front \\/here Did tb.e Money 
Come? 
Understand that. for a Jagade of 
prosperity and financiail healtb to 
work. Enron still needed an actual and 
tangible ·innux of cash flo\ving into 
the operation. At this iunctltre, it is 
iinporta.nt to appreciate tbe clout and 
influence that Euron wielded wiiliin 
the businuss comn1unily. Everyone 
wanted to do business "'ith Enron. 
Everyone wanted a piece of the "Enron 
pie." As a result, financial institutions 
were willing to do things tliat were of a 
"questionable natnre" to get cozy ,vith 
Enron. t\ccordingly. banks sttch as JP 
?v!organ Chase & Co., Citigroup, ru1d 
?vforgan Stanley (lenders) ,vere willing 
participants ill Enron's financial 
1nanipulation schen1es. 
The Lenders' Role and Why 
They Agreed 
As was men lioncd earlier, the trust 
was the entity purchasing; the Class B 
interests in the Asset LLC. The trust 
would finance the purchase price 
of the Class B interest primarily by 
borrowing under a credit facility 
provided by lhe lenders.. Tl1e trust 
would in Lurn transfer tl1e money to the 
Asset LLC. The Asset LLC ,vouJd then 
transfer tho rnoney to Enron. Eru·on 
would thon iinproperly record the 
cash inflow fron1 these transactions as 
cash flows from operations when, in 
fact. this was money Lhal came froin 
1he lenders. not n1011ey generated from 
operations. 
The logical inquiry thal follows is 
whal would then induce a financial 
institution to givo money to a trust 
under these circurnstances? The 
ru1swer is in the fu1al piece of tJ1e FAS 
140 puzzle, in what is referred to as a 
"Total Return Swap." The swap in this 
context was, in essence. a guarantee. 
~Vith the FAS 140 transactions, Enron 
guru·mleed. on behalf of the trust, Uie 
payments the trust "'as obligated to 
pay the lenders. Therefore, whatever 
shortfall resulted fron1 the ·transferred 
asset not generating the requisite cash 
to service lite debt obligalion, Ellfon, 
through the S\vap, guarauteed to tbe 
lenders. ln even the ,nost general of 
terms, under GAAP \'!here one party 
obligates itself to a debt obligation, 
GJ\AP requires lhal Ute obligor record 
and disclose that fiomcial obligation. 
But Enron, in n1ost of n1e transactions 
structured in this 1na1u1er, did not 
disclose the obligations. 
In Sum 
rn stun, pared dotvJJ again to the 
lowest com1non denorninator, Enron 
inJlated its earnings and cash flows 
from operations (1) by improperly 
recording transferred assets over 
which Eruon still rnaintained 
control as sales: (2) by reporting the 
proceeds from the sales as cash-
110\VS front operations ,vhen. in 
fact. it should have recorded U1ose 
items as secured borrowings; 
the lenders as debt obligations. ~\lhen 
Ll1cse transactions wore vetted through 
a tr8.llsparen L lens, the fallacies and 
falsHies in \vhat Enron ,vas doing \vas 
dear. But, of course, hindsight is 20-20. 
W11ere Do \\Te Go Fron1 Herc? 
The big push now by !hose that se1 
accounting and reporting standards is 
how to prevent another Enron from 
happening in ilie future. Efforts are 
under way, with the success of such 
efforts being perhaps a topic for another 
day. But for now, the n1e1nbers of tl1e 
investing and accounting standard-
selling community take solace in the 
fact that its previously closed eyes are 
no,v open ,v.itb a heightened vigilance. 
Next time, the community hopes it 
,viii see the wool before it is pulled 
over its eyes. I 
K .,. 
(3) and finally. by guaranteeii1g 
pay:ment of the 1noney through 
the swaps, when it did not 
record the money received from 
+ 
)I 
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